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Perhaps when Anna holds her newborn baby for the first time, she undergoes an epistemically transformative experience -she learns what its like to hold her newborn baby. And perhaps Bob also undergoes a transformative experience when he holds his newborn baby. But there isn't much reason to think that the information they now have access to, via their transformation, is the same -even if it shares some commonalities. That is, there isn't much reason to think that what it's like for Anna to hold Anna's baby is the same thing as what it's like for Bob to hold Bob's baby.
Indeed, it would pretty implausible if the phenomenal content of these experiences were the same, given all the different experiences that will have led up to them, and all the differences in the two people who are the subjects of the experience. Perhaps holding your new baby is a type of experience that is generally epistemically transformative. That doesn't mean its always transformative in the same way. It might generally lead to new phenomenological information -but to different new phenomenological information for different people. ! ! Similarly, suppose that near-death experiences are often personally transformative.
Even given this commonality, such experiences will likely be transformative in strikingly different ways for different people. Suppose that Ciara and Dani both survive sudden, near-fatal car accidents. Ciara decides, in the wake of this experience, that you only live once, so you have to live to fullest. She quits her city job to pursue her dream of becoming a white water rafting guide. She starts working on her 'bucket list', learns to parachute and bungee jump, and generally begins to pursue high-octane adventure. Dani, in contrast, becomes strikingly more risk averse. She makes a will and begins to carefully invest her savings. She starts to exercise, eat healthily, get plenty of sleep, and generally take better care of herself. She spends more time with family and friends. ! ! Both Ciara and Dani's experiences are personally transformative, but the way in which they were personally transformative is very different. They each re-evaluate their goals, priorities, and preferences -and perhaps even their self-conception -but they do so in very different ways, and to very different results. That an experience is personally transformative doesn't tell you how it is personally transformative. The same type of experience can be equally transformative for two different people, but transform those people in two very different ways. ! !
HARD AND EASY TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCE!

! !
It's tempting to think of transformativeness as an inherent aspect of experience.
Some experiences are just special. But as discussed in (1), this isn't quite rightwhether an experience is transformative can depend on factors external to that experience. Whether an experience is transformative can be partly determined by independent facts about the person having the experience, and partly determined by facts about the wider social context in which the experience is had. It's this latter set of factors I now want to focus on.! ! It's the wider social context of Great Expectations -and Pip's position in it -that make his inheritance transformative. No doubt aspects of Pip's personality play a role as well. But the socio-economic structures of Victorian England facilitate the kind of transformation Pip experiences -they make it easy for coming into wealth to be (very) transformative. In a society where there was less socio-economic stratification, or less social emphasis placed on class, it would be less easy for Pip's experience of inheritance to be transformative, or transformative to the same degree.! ! Similarly, let's follow Paul (2014) and assume that becoming a parent is often a very transformative experience. Conditions and expectations surrounding parenthood for wealthy, educated people in modern, western societies no doubt facilitate the transformativeness of the experience of parenthood. Parenthood is often the result of careful deliberation, it is highly anticipated (and typically delayed well beyond the beginning of reproductive age), and it is upheld within our society as something that adds special meaning or significance to life. With all these conditions in place, it's not surprising that parenthood might often be experienced as transformative. But this isn't obviously a feature of parenthood simpliciter -parenthood devoid of the complex socio-economic circumstances in which it occurs. Whether a 17-year-old living in a multi-generational agrarian community in the 1800s would, for example, experience parenthood as transformative in the same way, or to the same degree, seems doubtful. ! ! But just as social conditions can make it easy for an experience to be transformative, they can also make it hard. In a society with very little emphasis on class and a high degree of social mobility, it would be hard for an experience of sudden inheritance like Pip's to be transformative, or transformative to the same degree. It wouldn't be impossible -there might still be people who care a very great deal about wealth and social standing, even if that isn't the social norm -but transformativeness of such an experience would be unusual or atypical. ! ! With all this in mind, I want to make the following general claims. A set of social conditions, S, make it easy for a type of experience, E, to be transformative just in case: (i) in nearby worlds in which S obtains, E-type experiences are often or typically transformative; (ii) in nearby worlds in which S does not obtain, E-type experiences are not often or typically transformative. Conversely, a set of social conditions, S, 2 make it hard for a type of experience, E, to be transformative just in case: (i) in nearby worlds in which S obtains, E-type experiences are not often transformative or are atypically transformative; (ii) in nearby worlds in which S does not obtain, E-type experiences are more often or not atypically transformative. ! This account of will, of course, face the standard types of problems encountered by 2 counterfactual definitions. It will, for example, give the wrong results if the nearby worlds at which social conditions S don't obtain are such that social conditions S* obtain, and S* also make it easy for E-type experiences to be transformative. I'm giving these counterfactuals in order to give a basic gloss on how I'm understanding what it is for transformative experience to be made easy (or hard). I don't want to read too much into this as a counterfactual analysis, and it will no doubt be subject to funny counterexamples.
!
The gendered norms of 1830s England make it easy for Dorothea's marriage to be a transformative experience. And more specifically, they make it easy for her marriage to be transformative in specific ways -ways which subsume her wishes, her preferences, and her sense of self to that of her husband. Arguably, that they make it so easy is a a bad thing -it is part of the structural badness of such norms that they make transformative experiences like Dorothea's easy. The kind of self-abnegation involved in Dorothea's transformative experience is harmful to her. It changes her in a way that leaves her feeling lonely, unfulfilled, and frustrated. And it's not just harmful to Dorothea. Eliot suggests that Dorothea is a better, clearer thinker than Casaubon. If she had been able to pursue her own projects and ideas, she would likely have produced more valuable work than he ever could. But the transformative experience she undergoes, upon her marriage, leaves her with a very poor opinion of her own taste and judgement, and teaches her to value Casaubon's opinion above her own. ! ! Abstracting away from the particular case of Dorothea and 1830s gender norms, the more general point I'd like to make is this. Sometimes the fact that social conditions make it easy for a particular type of experience to be transformative is harmful. It can be too easy for an experience to be transformative, and it can likewise be too easy for an experience to be transformative in specific ways. There can be cases in which an experience's being transformative -or being transformative in a particular wayconstitutes a harm, and insofar as social conditions make that kind of transformation easy, they perpetuate that harm. ! for being or becoming disabled to be transformative is this way, given the current social norms and stereotypes surrounding disability. As Linton (1998) points out, many of the positive transformative aspects of disability have to do with experiencing an affirming and accepting sense of disability identity, and the sense of community with other disabled people that this can bring. And yet, she argues, dominant stereotypes about disability suggest precisely the opposite. Disability is not, as standardly understood, something that gives you access to -or something you experience with -a community. Disability is individual tragedy or private burden.
Similarly, we tend to think of the potential good effects of disability only in terms of overcoming disability -the perseverance, the patience, the fortitude that being disabled can teach. The thought that disability could actually be a positive aspect of someone's self-conception -something they value about themselves, for its own sake -is an idea that's incredibly foreign to most people. ! ! Nowhere is this more telling than in the fact that 'I've never really considered you disabled' or 'I don't think of you as disabled' are things that non-disabled people say, to disabled people, as compliments. When a non-disabled person says 'I've never really considered you disabled', they don't typically mean that they don't consider you to have a condition that is generally thought of as a disability. They aren't expressing surprise that you use an accessible parking spot or bathroom stall. What they're saying is that they've never really considered you less than or deficient in some See Townend, Tinson, Kwan, and Sharpe (2010) 9 See Nario-Redmond, Noel, and Fern (2013) 10 See Bogart (2014). Bogart interprets her findings as follows: 'Results suggest that rather than 11 attempting to "normalize" individuals with disabilities, health care professionals should foster their disability self-concept. Possible ways to improve disability self-concept are discussed, such as involvement in the disability community and disability pride.' transformative experiences involving a positive sense of disability self-identity stand out as atypical or rare. They are certainly not the norm or the expectation -and seem very often to be mediated by interaction with the disability rights community, an interaction which is itself not the norm or the expectation. We expect disabled people to try to 'overcome' their disabilities and to hope for 'a cure'. Neither of these expectations cohere well with a positive sense of disability as an important, valuable part of disabled peoples' self-identity. ! ! And so, I contend, current norms and stereotypes about disability make the kind of personally transformative experiences described by Linton, Brown, and Thompson hard. These experiences are atypical, but I suggest that they are atypical -at least in part -because of the dominant norms and stereotypes about disability. Furthermore, I suggest that it is harmful to disabled people if our current norms and stereotypes about disability make these transformative experiences hard. These experiences are a valuable aspect of being disabled, and they have the potential to have significant positive impact on the wellbeing of disabled people. If they are hard to come by, that's harmful. ! ! 7. TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCE AND SOCIAL IDENTITIES ! ! I have argued that social conditions can make it hard for certain kinds of experiences to be transformative (or to be transformative in certain ways or to certain extents), and that social conditions can likewise make it easy for certain kinds of experiences to be transformative. And I've further argued that sometimes whether it is hard or easy for a certain kind of experience to be transformative can be a matter of social justice. Sometimes the fact that social conditions make it hard (or easy) for an experience to be transformative constitutes can constitute a harm (or a benefit). ! ! I want to summarize by making a claim about the relationship between personally transformative experience and identity. Experiences are personally transformative when they re-shape your self-conception or sense of self-identity. But self-conception and sense of self-identity aren't developed in cultural isolation. Social norms and structures make certain ways of interpreting or thinking about ourselves readily available. Faithful husband, loving mother, brilliant genius, tragic overcommer, selfsacrificing caregiver, breadwinner, muse -these are all ways we can think about ourselves and our own experiences. Which ways of thinking about ourselves are most salient or readily available will be, at least in part, a function of the social norms and structures in which we find ourselves. ! ! If a personally transformative experience is one that re-shapes our sense of self, then personally transformative experiences can be radically affected by which ways of reshaping our sense of self are salient to us. 'Submissive and dutiful wife' was, in 1830s
England, an easy way for Dorothea Brooke to understand herself and her own experience. 'Free-thinking scholar' was not. 'Brave inspiration' is an easy way for disabled people to understand their own experiences now. 'Thriving person in an unconventional body' is not. ! ! What ways of understanding yourself and your own sense of identity your social situation makes salient needn't always be a normatively weighty matter. Plausibly, sometimes a type of identity might be readily available -and a corresponding transformational experience might be made easy -for reasons of (not ver y interesting) cultural accident. Perhaps, for example, being a Mod or a Rocker in 1960s England really was an important part of some peoples' sense of identity, and perhaps some people really did undergo personally transformative experiences when they found their scene. Nevertheless, whether one can easily identify as a Mod or a Rocker doesn't seem to be a particularly pressing matter of social justice. Indeed, it seems large a matter of accident -to be a Mod or a Rocker you just have to be in the right place at the right time. !
